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Abstract
Several empirical observations suggest that when women have more autonomy over their reproductive
decisions, fertility is lower. Some evolutionary theorists have interpreted this as evidence for sexual
conflicts of interest, arguing that higher fertility is more adaptive for men than women. We suggest the
assumptions underlying these arguments are problematic: assuming that women suffer higher costs of
reproduction than men neglects the (different) costs of reproduction for men; the assumption that men
can repartner is often false. We use simple models to illustrate that 1) men or women can prefer longer
interbirth intervals (IBIs), 2) if men can only partner with wives sequentially they may favour shorter
IBIs than women, but such a strategy would only be optimal for a few men who can repartner. This
suggests that an evolved universal male preference for higher fertility than women prefer is implausible
and is unlikely to fully account for the empirical data. This further implies that if women have more
reproductive autonomy, populations should grow, not decline. More precise theoretical explanations
with clearly stated assumptions, and data that better address both ultimate fitness consequences and
proximate psychological motivations, are needed to understand under which conditions sexual conflict
over reproductive timing should arise.

1. Introduction
There is a large demographic literature on gender and fertility which broadly shows that greater
gender equality is linked to lower fertility (though within very low fertility societies, greater gender
equality is often associated with higher fertility) [1] . This is commonly interpreted by social scientists
as women exercising their preferences for smaller families than men when they have the power to do
so[2–5, but see 6 for a more nuanced understanding]. While female autonomy and empowerment are
operationalized in diverse ways, their definitions share an emphasis on women being able to act in their
individual interests with limited social coercion.
Evolutionary social scientists are also interested in gender relations and their impact on fitnessrelevant outcomes such as fertility. This interest stems from the theoretical expectation of sexual
conflicts of interest, and has led to many parallel conclusions to those of the conventional demographic
literature. Thus, observations that women often report wanting fewer children than men do [7–10] and
that cultural institutions that reduce women’s reproductive autonomy (e.g. patrilocality, polygyny and
patriarchal norms) are associated with higher fertility [11–15] have been interpreted as evidence that
natural selection has favoured lower fertility, and specifically longer interbirth interval (IBI),
reproductive strategies for women than for men [11,16,17]. Sexual conflicts of interest arise if males or
females can pursue reproduction with more than one mate. For example, one individual may benefit
from extracting parental investment from their partner, while this partner would benefit more from
pursuing other mates. Nearly all human societies allow individuals of at least one gender to remarry,
*Author for correspondence: Cristina Moya (moya@g.harvard.edu).
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minimally upon the death of their spouse, which can decouple the spouses’ reproductive interests and
thus increase conflicts insofar as this increases men’s or women’s outside options. However, humans
have also experienced selection towards long-term monogamous pair-bonding that should lower such
sexual conflicts [18]. In these long-term pair bonds, a man suffers from his partner’s costs of
reproduction—e.g. if she suffers higher mortality risks that lower the number or survival of her
children, then his fitness will also be adversely affected because her children are also his. Husbands’ and
wives’ fitness are therefore typically closely tied in humans [19]. In this paper, we draw attention to
some of the assumptions in the evolutionary literature on human sexual conflicts over reproduction,
and question whether the empirical patterns result from differing optimal strategies for men and
women. To do so, we first review some of the empirical evidence that men and women disagree on
fertility decisions. Next, we consider some of the problematic assumptions in evolutionary work that
interprets this literature in the light of sexual conflicts of interest. Such work has tended to rely on
verbal arguments rather than formal theoretical models. So in section 2, we use simple models to
illustrate the importance of formalizing intuitions when drawing conclusions about sex differences in
this regard. We also use these models to draw some simple predictions about the ways that mating
systems and individual differences affect sexual conflicts of interest over reproductive pace, a proxy for
fertility. These models are not intended to be comprehensive or conclusive determinations of whether
sexual conflicts of interest are of great importance to fertility, but rather as illustrations that several
conditions influence the degree of sexual conflict and whether it will be expressed as men or women
desiring faster reproduction. Our results suggest that universal sex differences in optimal strategies are
unlikely to account for the empirical patterns described in section 1a. In section 3, we return to the
empirical observations and discuss alternative explanations for these.

(a) Does the empirical literature show that men want higher fertility than
women do?
Because actual fertility outcomes depend on both male and female behaviour, and may therefore
represent compromises made between reproductive partners, ideal family size (IFS) has been used to
compare the private reproductive preferences of men and women [17]. Several reviews of the

empirical evidence on differential desired fertility in developing countries suggest that men and
women usually agree on IFSs, but that when discrepancies do occur, men are more likely to favour
larger families than women are, though female preferences for larger families are also observed [6–
8]. We have reviewed the literature on sex differences in IFS and show in figure 1 that this
discrepancy varies by world region (see the electronic supplementary material for sources used in this
review). These sex differences in desired family size have been highlighted in the evolutionary
literature [16,17,20] and are explicitly, or implicitly, interpreted as reflections of different fitnessoptimizing strategies. Cross-cultural comparisons of fertility across societies with varying degrees of
female autonomy provide another tactic for examining the private reproductive preferences of
women relative to men. Researchers have noted that women living patrilocally (i.e. with, or near,
their in-laws) often have higher fertility than women living matrilocally. A recent review suggests
that a greater proportion of studies examining the effects of a woman’s in-laws show positive effects
(approx. 85%) on her fertility outcomes than those examining the effects of a woman’s parents
(approx. 50%) [21]. The pro-natal effects of patrilocality has been documented at both the individual
level in several societies [11,12,22–24] and at the community level [24,25]. Some have interpreted
these individual-level findings as resulting from a woman’s in-laws pressuring her to have more
children than she might want [22]. Such logic might be extended to the group-level if patrilocal
communities develop higher fertility norms that reflect the interests of coalitions of related men or of
patrilines that benefit from growth.
Polygyny tends to co-evolve with other institutions that limit female autonomy [13], but its
relationship to fertility is harder to interpret since it reveals different patterns at the group and
individual levels. Several studies have reported that women in polygynous households have lower
fertility than their monogamous counterparts in the same society [26,27], but polygynous societies
tend to have higher fertility than monogamous ones [28]. Some evolutionary scholars interpret this

higher fertility as being against women’s interests, but are ambiguous whether it is specifically
against her fitness interests [13]. It is worth noting that polygyny could empower women by
increasing their mating options [27]— i.e. they can choose to be the only wife of a poorer man, or
share a wealthier man with co-wives—and recent research questions the causal role of polygyny in
lowering women’s fitness outcomes like child health [29]. However, inter-male competition for
wives in these contexts tends to lead to younger ages at marriage for women, and less autonomy for
them in such relationships with larger age gaps [13]. This suggests that a woman’s reproductive
schedule may reflect her spouse’s preferences more than her own.
Finally, some direct metrics of female autonomy and indirect measures, such as education,
have been implicated as important predictors of fertility decline or lower desired fertility [30,31].
This has led some researchers to suggest that the nineteenth to twentieth century demographic
transitions reflect female preferences for lower fertility [3,4], and furthermore that these preferences
may reflect females’ adaptive reproductive strategies for smaller family sizes [20,32 –35]. This is a
nascent field of inquiry among evolutionists and the arguments are not yet well fleshed-out, but the
empirical association between female education and lower fertility is well documented at both the
individual and group levels [36–39].
These patterns, and their interpretation in the literature, give the impression that women
would have lower optimal fertility rates if they were not being coerced by husbands, in-laws or male
mates into higher fertility strategies that only benefit the latter. Some authors are explicit in claiming
that these reflect evolved adaptive strategies, while others are more ambiguous and may consider that
currencies other than fitness (e.g. short-term health and economic status) affect decision-making.
While some of the empirical findings reviewed above seem robust, we believe invoking adaptive
universal female strategies for lower fertility to explain these effects is premature and does not take
full advantage of the theoretical modelling work in this field. We next review some shortcomings of
previous verbal arguments that rely on sexual conflict in reproductive decision-making to explain the
above phenomena in humans.

(b) Do differential costs of reproduction between the sexes result in sexual
conflict over family size?
Several authors have argued that a man should favour larger families because the cost of
producing each offspring is lower for him than for a woman [10,32]. However, differential costs do not
mean that men and women necessarily have different optimal fertility strategies (but see the electronic
supplementary material for how it can affect sexual conflicts of interest). For example, natural selection
can favour the same optimal family size preference trait of six children in both males and females over
evolutionary time, even if the asymmetric costs of reproduction weakens the strength of selection for six
rather than five children in women, but not men. To our knowledge, no paper on humans shows that
different reproductive rates within a relationship are optimal for men versus women. Penn et al. [32]
purport to show greater fitness costs for women than for men of greater fertility in a pre-industrial
North American population. However, the actual consequence of reproduction reported is parityspecific parental mortality, rather than fitness [32]. Given the low parental mortality rates reported in
this study, even the negative effect of dying on number of grandchildren and its effect on geometric
mean fitness over evolutionary time do not seem to outweigh the fitness benefits of having an extra
child in this population for both men and women, although these should be calculated more directly
from the data. This suggests no clear conflicts of interest over offspring number in this population, as
has been documented in other similar populations [40].
Further, men also suffer costs of reproduction, although these may be experienced differently.
While women often experience higher physiological and parenting costs to reproduction, men pay
reproductive costs in terms of acquiring and keeping mates, and may also engage in parenting. The last
is associated with slight mortality increases after parenthood [32]. As further evidence that these are
significant costs, it is worth noting that age-specific mortality is higher for males than females, and
particularly higher for young men in part because they engage in high-risk forms of intra-sexual
competition [41]. These costs to male reproduction cannot be neglected.

(c) Can males easily replace mates?
The argument that men should prefer higher fertility than women because women suffer higher
costs of reproduction is typically associated with the assumption that a man can easily replace his
spouse should the costs of reproduction prove too high for her—e.g. if she dies in childbirth. However,
most males with such a strategy are statistically unlikely to be able to find another mate, or will pay
considerable costs to do so. This is because acquiring mating opportunities entails competing with other
males directly, or putting effort into attracting females. Fisherian sex ratios are constrained to be
roughly equal in diploid organisms, because for most population structures daughters and sons will
have equal fitness (though see [42] for an exception). This means that men and women will have the
same number of mating opportunities on average [43], and thus any attempt by one male to acquire a
new partner will reduce mating access for other men. This limit of reproductive opportunities for men is
reflected in the nearly universal higher reproductive variance for men than for women, and the higher
rates of never-married men than women [44]. Several features of human operational sex ratios
exacerbate the costs of replacing female mates (see the electronic supplementary material).
Note that in all societies there are likely individual differences between men in quality, which
will influence their attractiveness as mates and their likelihood of repartnering. Men who have been
married once may have realistically high perceptions that they will be able to repartner. Marriage
institutions and sexual mores also affect the ease of repartnering. Norms favouring large differences in
age at marriage between men and women can change sex ratios in favour of men of marriageable age.
Furthermore, variation in population-level wealth distributions and female preferences can affect how
much a few men monopolize mating opportunities. This means that in some societies men deemed
marriageable may have an easier time repartnering, at the expense of lifelong partner-free males. These
caveats illustrate the importance of taking context and individual characteristics into account when
exploring sexual conflict. In section 2, we build a formal model to illustrate the kinds of conditions under
which sexual conflict over reproductive pace is likely if women, and then men, have at least some
possibility of repartnering, and the direction of the conflict

2. Formalising sexual conflict over reproductive output: does
multiple mating by women or men result in male preferences for
faster reproduction?
Although the empirical literature focuses on total fertility because it is easy to measure, we
model optimal birth spacing since it is easier to formalize the differences in the trade-offs for men and
women using this outcome than using fertility. All else equal, reproductive pace should be a reasonable
proxy for fertility. However, this assumes that people will use their full reproductive careers to optimize
their reproductive success. Our framework also assumes that a woman’s reproductive career can be cut
short if she dies prematurely, and we allow this risk to be affected by her IBI. This is one way she can
have a fast reproductive pace, but low lifetime fertility. We first describe a static model of sex
differences in optimal birth interval given that women, and then men, can repartner. Then we consider a
more complete demographic structure, individual variation in male mate quality, and constraints on
repartnering using an agent-based model of reproductive pacing decisions. The agent-based model also
allows us to track maternal mortality and therefore to measure the knock-on effect of reproductive
pacing strategies on total fertility. Our two models are meant to be illustrative rather than full
descriptions of the phenomenon. While it is not an exhaustive treatment, we discuss some other
potential sources of sexual conflict in reproduction in the electronic supplementary material and
suggest further readings. We also focus our models on serially monogamous conditions that are more
likely to result in reproductive conflicts between spouses than contexts with lifelong pair bonds. For
example, it is clear that there should not be sexual conflicts over number of offspring in purely
monogamous contexts where a male’s and female’s reproduction are completely tied to that of their
partner [45–47].

(a) Modelling a single birth interval
To illustrate trade-offs in reproductive pace, we start by modelling the optimal IBI for a man and
a woman following the birth of a child that is genetically related to both of them. Three parameters
contribute to both the mother’s and father’s optimal IBI calculation (see parameter key in box 1). We
assume that the survival of this first infant, I, increases with the IBI following its birth owing to lower
sibling competition and greater parental investment, e.g. via breastfeeding [48]. Similarly maternal
survivorship, M, increases if a woman waits at least some time after the first infant’s birth [49] to
reproduce again. On the other hand, the mother’s residual reproductive value (i.e. how many future
children she can produce times their quality), R, decreases the longer she waits because of senescence
[50]. This means that a female’s fitness, Wf (equation (2.1)) will be equal to the sum of the value of her
current child and her residual reproduction given that she survives to be able to reproduce.
Equation 2.1

𝑾𝒇 = 𝑰 + 𝑴 ∗ 𝑹

The male’s fitness via this partner is additionally affected by his paternity through time (we
consider his fitness via other partners later). We model the probability that the father sires the next
child, P, as a decreasing function of IBI. This reflects that the longer a man waits to impregnate his
partner again the more likely it is that he is not the father (e.g. either because of infidelity, divorce or his
death). This parameter moderates the worth of a woman’s residual reproductive value to the man, and
only affects the father’s (not the mother’s) optimal birth spacing calculation. This means that a male’s
fitness, Wm, can be formalized using equation (2.2):
Equation 2.2

𝑾𝒎 = 𝑰 + 𝑴 ∗ 𝑹 ∗ 𝑷

Each of I, M, R and P can be modelled as functions of IBI. The first two functions, infant and
maternal survivorship, increase with longer IBIs, whereas the last two functions— residual
reproductive value and paternity—decline with longer IBIs. We use logistic functions because they can
capture a range of monotonic shapes, and conveniently can asymptote at 0 and 1 thus constraining
values that should be interpreted as probabilities. For simplicity, we only manipulate two parameters
per logistic function at most.
We assume that the first child’s survival, I, asymptotes at a probability of 1 (see equation (2.3)
and dotted line in figure 2). The initial rate of neonate mortality, reflected in n, and maturation, m,
govern the shape of this survivorship curve and the extent to which there is a threshold-like effect of
investment on their survival. The maternal survivorship curve, M, can be similarly modelled (equation
(2.4)), with a parameter p affecting the perinatal mortality rate and r denoting the recuperation rate.
The mother’s residual reproductive value, R, decreases the longer she waits (see equation (2.5)
and dashed line in figure 2). Her residual reproductive value starts near s (where s > 0) and asymptotes
at 0, while the ageing parameter, a, affects the rate of this senescence (we fix the time at which
senescence starts declining represented by the 5 in the denominator’s exponent). This represents
decreasing fecundity and time available to produce more children. How fast paternity declines, f, and
when the decline begins, d, vary the shape of paternity uncertainty functions (see equation (2.6) and
solid lines in figure 2).
Equation 2.3

𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝑺𝒖𝒓𝒗𝒊𝒗𝒐𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑 (𝟏𝒔𝒕 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅) = 𝑰(𝑰𝑩𝑰) =

Equation 2.4

𝑴𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝑺𝒖𝒓𝒗𝒊𝒗𝒐𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑 = 𝑴(𝑰𝑩𝑰) =

Equation 2.5

𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒅𝒖𝒂𝒍 𝒓𝒆𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆 𝒗𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆 = 𝑹(𝑰𝑩𝑰) =

Equation 2.6

𝑷𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒄𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒚 = 𝑷(𝑰𝑩𝑰) =

𝟏
𝟏+𝒆𝒏−𝒎∗𝑰𝑩𝑰

𝟏
𝟏+𝒆𝒑−𝒓∗𝑰𝑩𝑰
𝒔
𝟏+𝒆𝒂∗𝑰𝑩𝑰−𝟓

𝟏
𝟏+𝒆𝒇∗𝑰𝑩𝑰−𝒅

For simplicity, we set maturation, m = 1 (equation (2.3)), and the starting residual reproductive
value, s = 1 (equation (2.5)) for the remainder of the paper. We numerically solve for the values of IBI
that maximize Wf and Wm. We can use this system of equations to investigate how variables like

paternity certainty, maternal and infant survival can affect optimal birth spacing for men and women,
and the extent of sexual conflict over reproductive pace—i.e. the sex difference in optimal IBI.

(i) Women sequentially acquire new mates.
One clear source of sexual conflict arises when a woman switches mates between reproductive
events. If a woman acquires a new mate he will have no genetic interest in her previous children, a
condition that is associated with infanticide in many species [51], and with higher rates of child
homicide, at least in Western countries [52]. This motivation may lead to a woman’s new partner
preferring a shorter IBI than a woman would [53,54]. This conflict of interest between reproductive
partners means that a father may want a woman to devote more of her reproductive resources towards
a current child that the father knows is his, rather than to her future offspring whom he may or may not
father. However, it is unclear whether the father’s optimal exploitation of maternal resources would
entail her prolonging the IBI following their shared child, or whether it would entail encouraging her to
have a shorter IBI in hopes of his being able to father her next child as well.
Here we use the model we specified above to investigate this issue. For now, we assume that
only women can acquire new mates and ignore the role of maternal mortality, setting M ¼ 1 (i.e. assume
p approaches 0 and r approaches infinity). Figure 2 shows that if paternity certainty decreases rapidly
after the birth of the first child (left-most paternity certainty curve) the father should actually want
longer IBIs than the mother (denoted as blue online or medium grey in print) as he values the first-born
child relatively more than the mother’s future offspring and wishes to buffer it from competition from
siblings that are likely less related to him. If paternity certainty remains high for a longer period of time
before decreasing (paternity certainty curves on the right-hand side of figure 2), the man’s fitness
interests resemble those of the woman so that they prefer an increasingly similar IBI (noted as green
online, or light grey in print). Note that curves where paternity certainty remains high after the birth of
the first child approach the effect of lifelong pair-bonding (either monogamous or polygamous). For
intermediate paternity uncertainty curves women prefer a longer IBI than men do since men benefit
from taking advantage of her reproductive resources at an intermediate time scale—i.e. men prefer to
father a second child more rapidly in order to increase the odds of fathering the next child before his
chances drop further. The electronic supplementary material shows the exact relative fitness values of
different IBI strategies for men and women as paternity certainty curves change.
This shows that the difference in optimal birth spacing for male and female partners can vary
substantially. A woman’s switching mates can motivate her partner to want her to have a shorter IBI
than she does so that he can capture more reproductive events, or a longer IBI so that his current child
receives greater maternal investment at the expense of future offspring unrelated to him. This is true
even without maternal mortality. So far, this means that men or women can prefer higher fertility
strategies given that we have set maternal mortality to zero, meaning that the faster IBI strategies
would be equivalent to higher fertility. Importantly, if paternity is constant through time the optimal IBI
for men and women will not differ regardless of the baserate uncertainty levels. This suggests that
polyandry, a rare form of pair-bonding where one woman is contemporaneously mated to two men,
does not necessarily increase sexual conflicts over reproductive timing if it only increases baseline rates
of paternity uncertainty, but paternity certainty does not change through time (see the electronic
supplementary material for a formal justification). This framework also demonstrates the importance of
knowing the exact effects of IBI on the rate of paternity decline, infant survivorship and the woman’s
residual reproductive value for determining the extent and direction of conflict. This variation and their
dynamics are further explored in the electronic supplementary material.
It is worth noting that in this model male preferences for longer, and shorter, IBIs for their mate
represent different avenues of exploitation, and both of these strategies would result in suboptimal
fitness outcomes for the woman. This implies that a population where women switch mates often
should have lower total fitness or population growth than one with less mate-switching, so long as
women represent the limiting resource for population growth and optimal male strategies affect
reproductive outcomes at either an evolutionary or behavioural time scale (for an empirical
demonstration over evolutionary time in Drosophila, see [46]). Next, we consider the consequences of
men being able to acquire multiple mates, even if mates are completely faithful to them.

(ii) Men sequentially acquire new mates
We can now add the possibility that men, or at least some (e.g. high status) men, can acquire
new mates in sequence.We analyse new mate acquisition after death, since verbal models of sexual
conflict often assume that men can easily repartner after wearing a wife out with childbearing (see the
electronic supplementary material for a model with repartnership after divorce).
Let us assume that a man can only repartner if his wife dies (thus maximizing sexual conflict).
This happens with a probability equal to maternal mortality (1 - M).
This means that men’s fitness could be approximated as
Equation 2.7

𝑾𝒎 = 𝑰 + 𝑴 ∗ 𝑹𝟏 ∗ 𝑷𝟏 +(𝟏 − 𝑴) ∗ 𝑹𝟐 ∗ 𝑷𝟐

This is equivalent to the sum of three terms—the value of his first infant, the remainder of the first
wife’s reproduction weighted by her probability of survival, M, and the second wife’s reproduction
weighted by the probability of the first wife’s death. If M = 1 then the model is equivalent to the first one
described above with only female sequential mating since the first wife never dies, meaning Wm =I + R1
*P1. Note, this assumes that the first infant’s survivorship, I, is not directly affected by the death of its
mother. This assumption is unrealistic, but increases the extent of conflict between the man and his first
wife, since he does not need her to ensure the well-being of their joint infant.
If the two potential wives’ values are equivalent (𝑅1 ∗ 𝑃1 =𝑅2 ∗ 𝑃2 ), then 𝑊𝑚 = 𝐼 + 𝑅 ∗ 𝑃.
Comparing this fitness function to that of a woman’s in Equation 2.1 (Wf = I + M * R), we see that a man’s
and woman’s fitness functions only differ in that the man’s fitness is affected by paternity changes, while
the woman’s is affected by maternal survival. Let us assume that paternity is assured and constant
through time, P=1, approximating a society where a man controls a woman’s full reproductive career.
This means that 𝑊𝑚 = 𝐼 + 𝑅 and 𝑊𝑓 = 𝐼 + 𝑀 ∗ 𝑅, so we investigate how the maternal survivorship
function, M, produces sexual conflicts.
With increasing baseline rates of maternal mortality, a woman’s optimal IBI increases, as does
the extent of conflict over reproductive timing (see horizontal lines in Figure 3 and electronic
supplementary material for formal justification). Moreover, if maternal survivorship increases with
longer IBIs, this can further motivate women to lengthen their IBIs, while a man’s decision is unaffected
by this dynamic since we assumed he would have another mate to immediately replace his deceased
one. This can also be seen in Figure 3. For example, for an intermediate perinatal maternal mortality
rate (e.g., p=1, where the lines cross the y-axis at 0.27) the shallowest sloped line, when maternal
survival improves most slowly, is red, indicating a much longer IBI preference for the woman than the
man. Beyond a certain recuperation rate (as r increases) the woman’s preferred IBI starts approaching
the man’s again as she needs less time to recover to get the benefits of increased survivorship. If the two
wives are of different value – i.e. 𝑅2 ∗ 𝑃2 ≠ 𝑅1 ∗ 𝑃1 – then the male’s reproductive decision-making starts
being affected by the exact form of the maternal survivorship and residual reproductive value functions
(see electronic supplementary material for further analysis of these dynamics).
Taken together this model suggests that maternal mortality can motivate sexual conflict in
reproductive timing through several pathways, assuming that men can mate with multiple women at no
cost, but only in sequence (see the electronic supplementary material for further discussion of these
pathways). Generally, maternal mortality will result in the woman preferring a relatively longer IBI than
the man. This is because we have only considered maternal survivorship functions, M, that increase or
are stable with IBI. However, the extent to which mates disagree about birth timing will depend on
several parameters like the baseline rates of maternal mortality, the effect that IBI has on maternal
mortality and the relative qualities of the first and second wives. Furthermore, if we allow maternal
survivorship, M, to decrease with IBI, for example because childbearing is more dangerous for older
women, this can motivate a woman to reproduce sooner than would be optimal for her male partner,
since he can repartner upon her death.
Another insight from these models is that there might be less spousal conflict over optimal IBIs
in polygynous marriages than in serially monogamous ones [10]. This is because men who can afford
additional mates can do so concurrently without having to forgo the future well-being of their current
spouses in order to attain another mate. In fact, in the simplest scenario polygynous men are likely to
optimize their own fitness by optimizing each of their spouse’s fitness if they are monopolizing their

partners’ whole reproductive lives. This would be true if adding an nth child had the same kind of effect
(positive or negative) on each wife’s fitness. That is, under these simple conditions a polygynous man’s
fitness, Wm, equalling the sum of his wives’ fitness, Ww1+Ww2...+Wwn, will be highest when each of his
wives’ fitness is maximized. This would lead to similar fertility preferences between lifelong polygynous
partners, much as we expect regarding lifelong monogamous pair-bonds.
We made several assumptions in this model to maximize the potential for sexual conflicts over
reproductive pace. For example, maternal mortality did not affect infant mortality, and men could
acquire new wives at no cost. Next, we relax the latter assumption in an agent-based model.

(b) Modelling a full reproductive span with constraints to repartnering
In this section, we use an agent-based model to analyse how IBIs evolve when wives are costly
to acquire because of (i) Fisherian sex ratios (equal numbers of males and females), (ii) men having a
longer reproductive career than women (25 years for men and 20 years for women) mirroring
reproductive senescence in humans, and (iii) maternal mortality in childbirth. However, first we
numerically calculate the optimal IBI for women, and for unconstrained men who can acquire a new
mate for free using a parallel set of assumptions and functions to those that we will use for the agentbased model. We can then use these as benchmarks to compare the effects of constraints on
repartnering and individual male differences in repartnering abilities on male IBIs and sex differences
in optimal IBIs. Numerical calculations are with discrete IBIs, which means we use months in this
section for greater resolution
As before, we assume that infant and maternal survival improve with longer IBIs (n= 5, p=4,
m=r=0.2). This means that infant survivorship starts near 0% and rises to nearly 100% by 4 years, while
the mother’s survivorship is about 10% for birth intervals of 9 months and exceeds 96% by
approximately 3 years. Short birth intervals are more detrimental to children than mothers, although
mother’s survival rate is unrealistically low to maximize sexual conflict.
We numerically calculate the woman’s fitness as the sum of the survivorship of her first
offspring plus the survivorship of each subsequent offspring multiplied by the probability that she is
alive to produce those offspring (Equation ) and compare the fitness for each possible IBI (in number of
months). Finally, the number of offspring can be calculated as the reproductive span divided by birth
interval (in this case, we will assume a reproductive span of 240 months or 20 years).
Equation 2.8

𝒇𝒍𝒐𝒐𝒓(

Ww = ∑𝒏=𝟏

𝟐𝟒𝟎
)
𝒊𝒃𝒊

𝟐𝟒𝟎

𝑰 ∗ 𝑴𝒏−𝟏 = 𝑰 + 𝑰 ∗ 𝑴 + 𝑰 ∗ 𝑴𝟐 + … + 𝑰 ∗ 𝑴𝒇𝒍𝒐𝒐𝒓( 𝑰𝑩𝑰 ) − 𝟏

By comparison, an unconstrained man’s fitness is the product of the number of offspring he
produces and the survivorship of children. In this example, we will assume (to maximize the conflict)
that men can replace any wife who dies—so he is not constrained by the wife’s mortality and this
expression is not included in his fitness calculation. This also assumes that a man can acquire an
additional wife and progress to the next birth in the allotted IBI. Figure 4 shows that the optimal IBI
(illustrated as open circles) for women is 3.33 years, whereas it is 2.8 years for men under these
circumstances. Reducing women’s survivorship would increase this sex difference in ideal birth interval,
but women’s survivorship is already unrealistically low.
Next we develop the agent-based model based on these functions, but add Fisherian sex ratios,
longer male reproductive spans and sex ratio consequences from maternal mortality. We also introduce
individual variation in male mate quality that affects their likelihood of repartnering. Once the
population structure has been initialized (see the electronic supplementary material), we begin the
evolutionary process in the agent-based model.
The life cycle—i.e. a generation for each cohort—includes: entering the population of
reproductive-aged men, making decisions about reproductive strategies each year for 25 years,
fathering the next generation of incoming men of reproductive age in proportion to their reproductive
success, and finally death. First we describe the strategy decisions men make each year and then the
way reproduction is allocated.
Each year men choose (i) whether to mate or switch mates (if there are available females) and
(ii) whether to reproduce. Reproductive decisions are based on a man’s inherited IBI preference and on
the time since his and his partner’s prior reproductive event. For example, men who have an IBI
preference of 40 months wait until both they and their female partner have gone 40 months without a
birth before choosing to reproduce.

Mate choices are made in order of the man’s own quality, where higher quality men get to
choose mates first. Male quality is based on two factors: 1) age, where men’s quality increases with age
and then declines (mirroring resource acquisition abilities in many societies), and 2) a random factor
𝑎
that is inherited from one’s father. Male quality can be summarized as −(180 − 0.75)2 + 1 + 𝜉 where 𝑎
represents age (in months) and 𝜉 represents the random factor. See the electronic supplementary
material for more model details. Each year men have the option of leaving their wives, and make their
decisions sequentially from the highest-quality to lowest-quality man. Each man opts to leave his wife if
he expects to have higher fitness with a different available mate. This calculation is based on two
factors: whether the potential new mate would be higher quality than his current one (the answer will
always be yes if the man has no mate) and the cost of his leaving for his young children’s survivorship.
Female quality depends on the number of reproductive years she has left, and her recent reproduction.
A woman who recently reproduced is less desirable than a woman of the same age who has not recently
reproduced. This reflects the constraint that a woman’s and her next infant’s survivorship are greater
after long, compared with short, birth intervals. If the man leaves a mate, any offspring they have under
age 5 will be of lower quality. Furthermore, each child’s survivorship depends on his mother’s IBI and
1
has a likelihood:
𝐼𝐵𝐼 . While maternal IBI affects child survivorship, in this model, women have no
1+𝑒

(5−

5

)

choice regarding divorce or when to reproduce. This is because the model was designed to examine
men’s optimal reproductive timing, meaning we only allowed these decisions to evolve.
At the end of 25 years of yearly decisions, we compare the relative lifetime fitness of males in the
dying cohort in order to determine whose children will enter the population of reproductive-aged men.
Dying men will father the next cohort of reproductive men in proportion to their lifetime fitness
compared to cohort mates. Each man’s lifetime fitness is calculated as the sum of the survivorship of
each of the children he had, reduced by each child’s quality loss owing to any early life paternal
absences after divorce. This allows us to maintain a stable population size since the incoming group of
men will have a fixed size equivalent to the number of males exiting the model.
There are equal numbers of males and females (20 each) entering reproductive age each year.
Each incoming group of females is identical to each other (the only difference between any two women
in the model is their age, where younger women have greater reproductive value). Incoming men
inherit the birth interval preference of their father plus some random value from a normal distribution
(𝜇=0, 𝜎= 2). Men also inherit the quality of their father, plus some random variation from a normal
distribution (𝜇= 0, 𝜎=0.05). We let this model run for 25,000 iterations to see how IBI preference
evolves over time.
Results show that a male’s optimal birth interval preference depends on his quality. If we
examine birth intervals for the last 10,000 men who exit our model, we can see that men with higher
quality are more likely to have a preference for shorter birth intervals (see Figure 4). Men of lower
quality have birth interval preferences closer to women’s optimal birth interval (mean of 3.32 years for
the lowest quartile of quality), while men with greater quality have shorter birth intervals (approx. 3.24
years for the highest quartile). Remember from our analytical solution that ideal birth interval should be
approximately 3.3 years for women, and 2.8 years for men. So while men of higher quality are more
likely to diverge from the woman’s optimum, average or below-average men cannot afford to exploit
their wives because they will not be able to replace her if she dies. On average, however, men can evolve
shorter IBI preferences than women in this scenario because there are no advantages to any men of
reproducing more slowly than is optimal for women. Even the low-quality men, whose preferences do
not get expressed if they cannot acquire a mate, would not be able to do better than to express the
optimal IBI for women. However, while some men may desire shorter IBIs, they will not be able to
achieve a higher fertility per woman than she would want for herself since her reproductive career
would be curtailed by premature death in this model.

3. Re-evaluating the empirical literature
The models described above illustrate several important features of sexual antagonism over
reproductive pace. First, lifelong pair bonds should favour the same reproductive pace optima for men
and women. Second, men and women can differ in their optimal IBI, however if decreases in paternity
certainty are motivating this conflict, either men or women may prefer the longer IBI. Third, if men can

only partner with wives sequentially they may favour faster IBIs than a woman because of higher
maternal than paternal mortality rates. However, such a strategy would only be optimal for a minority
of high-quality men who can afford to replace their wives. How can we make sense of the empirical
literature about sexual conflicts of interest in light of these insights?3.1 Gender differences in ideal
family size (IFS)

(a) Gender differences in ideal family size
While gender discrepancies in IFS seem a clear indication of men’s higher fertility
preferences, the empirical patterns may reflect male preferences for more children over multiple
partners, rather than per woman. In contexts where polygyny is common, such as sub-Saharan Africa,
we may expect larger differences in ideal male and female fertility because men may hope to obtain
more mates in the future. The larger gender discrepancies in ideal fertility in studies conducted in
Africa lends some support to this argument (figure 1). Further, a cross-cultural study of unmarried
youths also found that women reported desiring fewer children than men did [6], perhaps because
unmarried men may imagine their fertility over several partners, whereas married men may envisage
future reproduction only with their current partner and thus report more similar IFSs to women.
While men’s potential reproductive rate is higher than women’s and they tend to benefit more from
multiple matings [55], this does not necessarily translate into a conflict within a particular couple
over the ideal number of children that they should have together. One might expect that a minority of
high-status men for whom multiple mates is an option may be driving these results, whereas the
majority of men who could only expect a single partner may report more similar IFSs to women’s.
It is also possible that IFS questions tap into different psychological biases from those that
evolved for reproductive decision-making. Questions about ideals may motivate optimistic responses,
including preferences in a world without constraints or trade-offs. Men are often more overconfident
than women [56], which may translate into an inaccurately high assessment of their ability to acquire
multiple mates or afford resources for multiple children. This highlights the importance of
distinguishing an individual preference from a strategy that is selected for in the context of real-world
tradeoffs and demographic structure. Furthermore, asking about fertility preferences may highlight
the health and opportunity costs of reproduction for women, rather than the costs for men in the
domain of mating competition and later parenting or provisioning.

(b) Institutions affecting female autonomy and fertility: patrilocality
The positive effects of in-laws on a woman’s fertility and reproductive pace have often been
interpreted as coercive reflections of her male partner’s fitness interests [11,12]. These arguments are
particularly surprising given that higher fertility and shorter IBIs are often used as indicators of higher
fitness. For example, in much of the cooperative breeding literature higher fertility, and probabilities of
progressing to a next birth, are interpreted as evidence that kin presence is helpful—presumably
because it increases fitness [57–59]. This inconsistency means the same empirical association of kin
presence with higher fertility is often interpreted as evidence of altruism, or of coercion, depending on
whether the family member is a woman’s mother [57,59] or motherin-law [11,60], respectively. In fact,
in most places where anthropologists have tried to measure the relationship between fertility and
fitness, including in high fertility contexts with limited effective contraception, these are positively and
monotonically related [61–64]. This does not necessarily mean that one or both arguments must be
incorrect: a woman’s costs to shorter IBIs can be lowered by supportive social relations, and she can be
coerced into a shorter (or longer) IBI by a mate unsure about his future paternity. However, we should
be devising better predictions for differentiating the hypothesized mechanisms of influence on
reproduction. This problem of multiple interpretations parallels inconsistencies in the development
literature where both high and low fertility outcomes can be interpreted as signs of women’s
disenfranchisement or as poor health outcomes [65].
In-laws’ pro-natal effects on women’s reproduction are often interpreted as coercive in part
because of ethnographic information about strains in such relationships [66,67]. Our models suggest

that men, and their kin, can benefit from a faster reproductive pace than the woman herself would
benefit from, in the case where he is high status and can replace his wife, or she is likely to repartner.
However, the mechanisms suggested by our models mean that if women were thus being coerced in
these patrilocal contexts their total fertility should be lower (e.g. because of premature death or wear on
her reproductive system). This suggests that if the in-law effects are evidence of evolved sexually
antagonist strategies, we would see more pro-natal in-law effects on IBIs than on total fertility. One
possible reason why it has been difficult to detect trade-offs between fertility and fitness is that we may
be under-sampling deceased women representing victims of such coercion. Alternatively, we may be
underestimating the fitness consequences to fast reproduction over evolutionary time by looking at
modern societies, but see the electronic supplementary material for reasons to be skeptical of the
relevance of such evolutionary lag.
An alternative adaptationist interpretation of the patrilocality effect is that women act in their
own self-interest by reproducing more in patrilocal than matrilocal contexts. This is because they
benefit less from helping other household members reproduce when they are living among less related
people than when they are living with more related individuals matrilocally [68]. On the other hand the
fact that the stated fertility preferences of daughters-in-law are lower than those of mothers-in-law in at
least one such patrilocal context [69] casts doubt on higher fertility outcomes necessarily reflecting a
woman’s true preferences. In such monogamous patrilocal contexts where women have explicitly lower
fertility preferences than in-laws, currencies other than fitness (e.g. health, pleasure, economic status)
may be motivating the discrepancies in preferences between unrelated household members.
Our models suggest that much closer attention needs to be paid to both the context in which
men and women are making fertility decisions, and individual differences between men and women.
There may be some limited circumstances under which men benefit from coercing women into higher
fertility—e.g. a relative surplus of women over men, and men being of high quality—but there are
alternative explanations for why women should reproduce faster in patrilocal contexts. Future research
should focus on testing between these alternative hypotheses, for example, by examining whether birth
intervals are particularly short in patrilocal contexts where women are in relatively plentiful supply

(c) Institutions affecting female autonomy and fertility: polygyny
While our models would not predict any difference in fertility between polygynously and
monogamously pair-bonded women all else equal, the empirical evidence suggests otherwise. At the
individual level, polygynously married women tend to have lower fertility, but these effects may be
driven by self-selection effects [70]—i.e. women in worse condition become later wives to polygynous
men [71,72]. This may help explain why we see the opposite effect at the group level; polygynous
societies have higher total fertility rates than monogamous ones [28]. These differences seem to be
driven primarily by the higher demand for women, which reduces the number of unmarried women and
pushes their age at first birth down, thus extending women’s reproductive lifespan [73].
Higher fertility through younger marriage has both fitness costs and benefits to women. Women
who start reproduction too early tend to experience greater infant mortality risks throughout adulthood
[74]. Optimal age at first birth models fit with data from pre-demographic transition populations show
that intermediate ages maximize a woman’s reproductive success, usually in the late teens, meaning
that lowering the age at first birth beyond that was predicted to reduce women’s fitness [63,74]. This
sets up a potential sexual conflict of interest between men needing to compete for younger wives, and
women having a later optimal age at first birth. On the other hand, earlier ages at first birth are often
empirically associated with higher number of surviving children [63,75– 78]. The net effect of this lower
age at first birth in polygynous societies seems to be positive for fitness and has tended to promote their
spread—e.g. of nineteenth century Mormons [79]. This suggests we should flip the question around and
ask why women in monogamous societies tend to wait so long to start having children when they could
increase their reproductive success by starting younger.
An additional source of sexual conflict may arise from spousal age differences in polygynous
societies because they increase the likelihood that a husband dies before the end of his wife’s
reproductive lifespan. As shown in our first model, this means an older husband may devalue a woman’s
future reproduction if he is unlikely to father her children in the distant future. This prediction can be
tested by checking whether women married to older husbands reproduce sooner upon marriage than

women with younger spouses, and have different IBIs. Furthermore, this effect should be particularly
strong in societies with high adult male mortality.

(d) Institutions affecting female autonomy and fertility: patriarchal norms
A few researchers have suggested that evolved female strategies for lower fertility are expressed
in societies with more female autonomy and can help explain the demographic transition [20,35]. There
is a broader social science literature that makes parallel proposals that patriarchal norms or women’s
low social status kept fertility high until recent centuries [2]. Although the latter literature is not
committed to evolutionary accounts, and therefore has no interest in whether the actors were pursuing
fitness-maximizing strategies, their argument hinges on a rather unlikely assumption that women have
little autonomy in any society pre-demographic transition. In fact, empirical evidence from high-fertility
societies on reproductive decision-making refutes this [7]. Furthermore, when considering the strategic
interests of individual actors it is difficult to imagine circumstances under which all men have similar
reproductive agendas, as illustrated in our agent-based model, and where gender categories constitute
coalitions.
Our models provide additional reasons to be skeptical of the role of universal male preferences
for higher fertility keeping reproductive rates high in pre-transition societies. The fact that the optimal
reproductive pace for men and women, and the sex difference in optimal strategies depend on factors
that vary both between- and within-population suggests the importance of conditional and flexible
strategies. Furthermore, any resolution of sexual conflicts that favours male strategies over female ones
in our models leads to suboptimal fitness outcomes for females. This can be either because she
reproduces more quickly or more slowly than would be optimal for her. Because population growth is
usually limited by the abundance of females, rather than the availability of males—i.e. all women can
reproduce with a few men—anything that reduces female fitness will likely reduce population growth.
This suggests that increases in female autonomy, power or leverage in mating systems should increase
the sum of individual women’s fitness, and therefore population growth. And yet the demographic
transitions of the past two centuries from high- to low-fertility strategies have been accompanied by
some of the largest increases in female economic and reproductive autonomy and led to the first
populations known to have below-replacement reproduction despite no resource scarcity. At the
individual level, most of the evidence to date suggests that adopters of these lower fertility strategies in
fact ended with lower lineage fitness—i.e. they had fewer descendants up to five generations down the
line [80,81].
A more nuanced examination of the evolution of male control of female reproduction reveals the
importance of considering diverse interests on the part of males [82]. There are many other proposed
pathways whereby improving the social capital of women can motivate lower fertility (e.g. changing
sources of social information or the status benefits to other behaviour) [36,37,83]. These explanations
do not rely on a commitment to the fertility reduction itself reflecting a fitness-maximizing strategy.

4. Conclusion
We should be clear that we are not arguing for the absence of sexual conflicts of interests in
human mating systems. Rather, we have shown that the presence of sexual conflicts of interest critically
depends on the mating system and a man’s ability to acquire more mates. Both of these vary
substantially cross-culturally (e.g. with marriage system), and the latter varies within populations as
well. Furthermore, our models illustrate that sexual conflicts can result in men benefiting from longer or
shorter IBIs than are optimal for women. This makes it problematic to make proposals about average
sex differences in optimal reproductive strategies.
We also show that several lines of evidence used to argue that women evolved preferences for
lower fertility strategies than men did require more careful analysis. Resolving conflicts of interest in
favour of female rather than male strategies should increase population growth [84]. This means that
empowering women to pursue fitness-relevant goals is unlikely to explain demographic transitions
towards lower fertility if these reproductive strategies are associated with lower long-term fitness
[80,81]. Similarly, the fact that polygyny and patrilocality are associated with population growth or
higher fertility, without a commensurate decrement in infant or maternal mortality, speaks against their
being detrimental to women’s fitness or their resulting in the maladaptive coercion of women.

We do not dispute that cultural practices that disenfranchise women are often associated with
higher fertility. However, we discuss how institutions like higher education, polygyny and patrilocality
can have these effects through different pathways. Furthermore, we believe these phenomena will
benefit from evolutionary explanations beyond those that we can derive from individual-level fitnessmaximizing logic. For example, norms prioritizing status-striving over reproduction may influence
women’s reproductive preferences more than men’s, given that women usually experience greater
opportunity costs when reproducing. More detailed theoretical work and linked empirical analyses that
consider both ultimate fitness consequences and proximate mechanisms can help elucidate the forms
and extent of sexual conflict in different socio-ecological contexts.
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Figure captions & Box
Box 1. Model Parameter Key
Wf = female fitness
Wm= male fitness
Fitness sub-functions
 I = 1st Infant’s survival
o n=neonate mortality
o m=maturation rate = 1
 M=Maternal survival
o p=perinatal maternal mortality
o r=recuperation rate
 R=Residual reproductive value (woman’s)
o s=starting residual reproductive value =1
o a=aging rate
 P=Paternity probability
o d=when paternity decline begins
o f=how fast paternity declines
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Figure 1. Literature review of gender differences in desired fertility. The number of effects showing males
with higher fertility preferences than women are shown in dark grey, those showing a higher fertility
preference for women are in light grey, and those with no difference are in white. These are sorted by
geographic region. See Supplementary Materials for a full listing of the referenced effects.
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Figure 2. Effect of women’s sequential mating on sex differences in optimal IBI. How paternity certainty
changes through time affects which parent wants a longer IBI. Each coloured line represents a possible rate at
which paternity certainty declines after having had a child (d=[1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9]). Paternity certainty
curves in blue indicate the father wants a longer IBI, those in red that the mother wants a longer IBI, and
those in green that they want similar IBIs. The speed of paternity certainty decline was held constant (f=0.8).
The dotted line represents the survival of the first child as a function of the succeeding IBI (survivorship
function parameters are n=3, m=1). The dashed line represents the residual reproductive value of the mother
as a function of IBI (with an aging parameter, a=0.5). Maternal survival rate, M, was held at 1.
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Figure 3. Effect of maternal survivorship on sex differences in optimal IBI when men can mate sequentially
after the death of a mate. How maternal survival, M, changes through time affects the extent to which a
woman wants a longer IBI. Each coloured line represents a possible maternal survivorship curve as a function
of IBI. These represent different baseline perinatal survivorship rates for mothers (p=[0,1,3]) and rates of

recuperation (r=[0.2,.4,.6,.8,1]). Maternal survivorship curves in red indicate that the mother wants a longer
IBI, and those in green that mothers and fathers want more similar IBIs. Note the absence of blue curves
indicates that men never wanted longer IBIs than women did for these conditions where men could remarry if
the woman died and paternity certainty, P, was held at 1. The dotted line represents the survival of the first
child as a function of the succeeding IBI (survivorship function parameters are n=3, m=1). The dashed line
represents the residual reproductive value of the mother as a function of IBI (with an aging parameter,
a=0.5).
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Figure 4. Birth intervals selected for women, unconstrained men, and men of varying quality. The first two
values (open circles) are from numerical solutions, while the male quality results are from the agent based
model (closed circles). The ABM results show the average IBI for the last 10,000 men who exit the model after
25,000 iterations. These men are divided by quality into quartiles.

